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This paper aims to fill the gaps in the analysis of risk-sharing channels at the mi-
crolevel, both within and across households. Using data from the Bank of Italy’s
Survey on Household Income and Wealth covering the financial crisis, we are able
to quantify in a unified and consistent framework several risk-sharing mecha-
nisms that so far have been documented separately. We find that Italian house-
holds were able to smooth on average about 85% of shocks to household head’s
earnings in both 2008–2010 and 2010–2012 spells. The most important smooth-
ing mechanisms turn out to be self-insurance through savings/dissavings (40%
and 47% in 2008–2010 and 2010–2012, respectively), and within-household risk-
sharing (16% and 14%). Interestingly, risk-sharing through portfolio diversifica-
tion and private transfers is rather limited, but the overall percentage of shock
absorption occurring through private risk-sharing channels hovers around four-
fifths, as opposed to around one-fifth of a shock cushioned by taxes and public
transfers, excluding pensions. In addition, by exploiting subjective expectations
on the following year’s household income, we find significant evidence of a lower
degree of smoothing of persistent shocks.
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...[T]he only way to obtain such measures [of income and consumption] is by imposing an
accounting framework on the data, and painstakingly constructing estimates from myriad
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1. Introduction
Households lie at the center of economic analysis, as they are the core unit of sev-
eral decision-making processes and perform many economically relevant roles. In fact,
there is a large literature focusing on the many roles that households play, both through
market transactions (purchases of goods and services, supply of labor and capital ser-
vices, management of home productions) and via nonmarket interactions (mutual as-
sistance). Many of these activities are aimed at sharing risk both among household
members and across households.
In fact, since Becker’s contributions (Becker (1973, 1974)), household economics has
often stressed the idea that marriage (formal and informal) fosters risk-sharing, as trans-
fers between spouses do achieve some smoothing of individual income streams’ vari-
ability. Some authors (for example, Chami and Hess (2005)) have gone as far as to sug-
gest that one of the motivations for marriage is to secure some hedging against income
risk. Several applied studies (which most frequently employ microdata) provide some
support for the idea that marriage achieves a certain amount of risk-sharing (as, for ex-
ample, in the contributions by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985, 1994), Rosenzweig (1988),
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), and others).
There is, however, another subtle way that marriage may influence risk-sharing, as
it may be the case that more risk-sharing comes at the expense of savings, as long as
people feel more secure in their spousal agreement (as suggested, for example, by Dev-
ereux and Smith (1994)). This might decrease the buffer stock from which consumption
shocks get smoothed, by the savings/dissavings channel.
As for risk-sharing across households, suffice it to note that the modern theory of
risk-sharing has been developed centered on the household (or the individual) as its
basic decision unit, entering transactions in the market (Arrow (1964), Townsend (1994);
see Huang and Litzenberger (1988) or Deaton (1992) for a systematization).
Yet despite the pivotal role that household risk-sharing plays in basic economic
agents’ decisions, very little empirical research has been devoted to the identification
and measurement of the mechanisms through which households cope with the risk of
income shocks, both between and within them. To be sure, initial empirical tests of risk-
sharing were carried out at the microlevel (Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Nelson (1994),
Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Declich and Ventura
(2000), Grande and Ventura (2001), Krueger and Perri (2005, 2011b), Gervais and Klein
(2010)); however, these studies could only test whether the null hypothesis of full risk-
sharing was rejected or not, without being able to identify or measure the economic
mechanisms at work. This is all the more unsatisfactory when one considers that the-
oretical models predicting partial risk-sharing have been put forward.1 On the other
hand, the macroliterature on interregional/international risk-sharing, whose theoreti-
cal underpinning is typically a representative–agent extension of the basic microframe-
work, has proceeded much further in the empirical analysis of risk-sharing channels.
1Incomplete risk-sharing may arise due to exogenous factors, such as market incompleteness and trans-
action costs, or endogenous factors, such as limited commitment or enforceability (see Kehoe and Levine
(1993); further developed by Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Krueger and Uhlig (2006),
Krueger and Perri (2011a)) and moral hazard.
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After the first regression tests of full risk-sharing (Canova and Ravn (1996)), a vast body
of literature has developed, starting with Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) (hence-
forth ASY (1996)) with the aim of measuring the extent of risk-sharing channels across
countries (or regions) within a unified framework.2
A much larger literature on consumption responses to income shocks has focused
on the intertemporal (as opposed to cross-sectional) reallocation of resources, under
the (often implicit) assumption that the only shock-absorbing mechanism available to
households was lending and borrowing in a bonds-only financial market.3 In sum, as
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) point out, beside household savings and borrow-
ing, there is scattered evidence on the role played by various partial insurance mecha-
nisms on household consumption.
This paper aims to fill the gap on the analysis of risk-sharing channels at the mi-
crolevel, both within and across households. Using data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey
on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) in 2008–2012, we regress consecutive house-
hold income measures (from household nonfinancial income to household income to
household disposable income) on household head’s earnings. By doing so, we are able
to quantify in a unified and consistent framework risk-sharing mechanisms that so far
have been documented separately. A well known mechanism is portfolio diversification,
which can be implemented through complete markets for contingent claims or appro-
priate more parsimonious (and realistic) financial structures. Its role has been studied
and quantified by Arrow (1964) and Townsend (1994), among others.4 Another classical
risk-sharing channel consists of fiscal transfer/tax mechanisms. This has been intro-
duced by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) and Von Hagen (1992). Dynarski and Gruber
(1997) study the smoothing effect on U.S. household consumption of government trans-
fers (including retirement income) and taxes separately. For Italy, Dedola, Usai, and Van-
nini (1999), Mélitz and Zumer (1999), and Decressin (2002) carry out analyses of pub-
lic risk-sharing, but at a macrolevel. An important, albeit less studied, channel of con-
sumption smoothing is intrahousehold risk-sharing, that is, the smoothing of the house-
hold head’s income shocks through other members’ income changes. Hayashi, Altonji,
and Kotlikoff (1996) and Dynarski and Gruber (1997) quantify the role of “wife’s earn-
ings,” finding little effects. On the contrary, García-Escribano (2004) models risk-sharing
within families explicitly, obtaining the opposite result. Informal risk-sharing between
households—through private gifts, transfers, aid, and services—has been posited by Cox
(1987) and extensively studied in developing economies, but rarely quantified in West-
ern countries, at least in the way we do in our empirical analysis. Finally, household self-
insurance through asset accumulation and depletion (lending and borrowing in credit
markets) has received the most attention, as it stems from the literature on permanent
income/life-cycle behavior. A related mechanism of self-insurance takes place through
2Tests of risk-sharing have also used correlation analysis to identify cross-country or cross-regional risk-
sharing. Examples of this strand of the literature include Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Pakko (1997),
Hess and Shin (1998), and many others.
3See the surveys by Deaton (1992) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017).
4As mentioned above, many seminal studies on risk-sharing, which explicitly or implicitly only took into
account portfolio diversification, aimed at testing full risk-sharing without embarking on its quantification.
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the (timing of) durable expenditures (see Attanasio (1999) for a discussion), and will also
be part of our investigation.
While the basic idea of our paper consists in applying the ASY (1996) methodology
to households instead of countries, a mere carryover of the ASY (1996) seemingly unre-
lated regression (SUR) estimation to a microsetting would be problematic. Indeed, dif-
ferences exist between macrodata on countries and microdata on households, as (i) the
former typically include the entire population, while the latter constitute a sample to
make inference on, with consequences in terms of selection bias and representative-
ness; (ii) macrodata are typically more reliable, both because they originate from offi-
cial sources and because they benefit from a sort of “washing out” due to aggregation,
whereas the latter may be marred by measurement errors, especially in income varia-
tion; (iii) by definition, at lower levels of aggregation the sociodemographic and eco-
nomic factors confounding the relation between consumption and income are more
numerous than at higher aggregation levels. Specifically, certain individual characteris-
tics, such as age and the presence of children at different stages of the life cycle plus other
possible predictor covariates affecting preference and smoothing capacity, do not even
have an obvious homologue at the aggregate level. Moreover, aggregation may get rid of
additional factors, such as temporary or sectorial shocks at the household level.5 There-
fore, risk-sharing mechanisms at lower aggregation levels can be identified only subject
to more controls (demographic, geographic, economic, family-linked) than at higher ag-
gregation levels.These difficulties may partly explain the relative scarcity of studies on
risk-sharing channels at the microlevel in the last 20 years.6
This paper takes on the task of identifying and measuring household risk-sharing
channels and addresses the issues outlined above in several ways. First, by focusing
on the household head’s income, rather than on the household income, we mitigate
endogeneity arising from the joint determination of consumption and hours of work
(Dynarski and Gruber (1997)) or other household-specific unobservable characteristics.
Second, by testing regressions with prime-age household heads, we can avoid issues
arising from life-cycle/permanent-income intertemporal choices, and focus on cross-
sectional (i.e., risk-sharing) aspects. Third, we address the issue of measurement errors,
which is particularly serious in survey microdata,7 and other sources of endogeneity in
5While the analysis of aggregate data may, under some hypotheses, also disclose relevant microeconomic
dynamics, thus making the so-called ecological inference problem less relevant, this turns out not to be the
case in the study of risk-sharing with microdata.
6To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers attempted to measure household risk-sharing chan-
nels. Three of them use a mere transposition of ASY (1996), without an explicit derivation from a theoretical
model and without controlling for demographic and economic characteristics of the household (Park and
Shin (2010), García-Escribano (2004)) or tackling the issue of the endogeneity of the main regressor in the
risk-sharing equations (Balli, Pericoli, and Pierucci (2016)). Two others do not adopt an ASY-like method-
ology: Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) only deal with two broad channels (risk-sharing between and
within families, not households), do not quantify them (as it only tests for full risk-sharing), and estimate
them separately, with a risk of overlaps. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) measures the extent of risk-sharing
mechanisms in the United States, but without embedding them in a unified, internally consistent, and the-
oretically based framework; as a consequence it is not clear that the various mechanisms identified in the
analysis are complementary and their measures do not overlap. None of these studies considers all seven
risk-sharing channels analyzed in this paper.
7See Nelson (1994).
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the main predictor by using an alternative predictor, obtained by instrumental variables
(IV) estimation. Fourth, by adopting a specification based on household’s (household
head’s) earnings as a regressor (instead of aggregate income), we can more easily ad-
dress the influence of taste shocks on the risk-sharing metric.8
Our reliance on SHIW data presents advantages which have been rarely exploited by
the risk-sharing literature. Indeed, unlike the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
which until recently only collected consumption data on food and housing, and not ev-
ery year, SHIW surveys collect data on all consumption items at a biannual frequency,
providing us with a more complete view of total consumption expenditure. In addition,
by using balanced panels of households over pairs of consecutive waves and using first
differences, we avoid the inefficiencies of unbalanced data plaguing most previous anal-
yses. Furthermore, unlike the Consumer Espenditure Survey (CEX) data, observations
on consumption and incomes in SHIW are collected for coincident periods. As Dynarski
and Gruber (1997) point out, the availability of U.S. representative consumption data
only in the PSID and CEX surveys has forced researchers to merge them with income
data at a higher level of aggregation,9 but the resulting averaging out of individual earn-
ings variation has been detrimental for risk-sharing estimates, which are based precisely
on those variations.10
In terms of strategy, our goal is descriptive, in the sense that we aim to establish styl-
ized facts on the degree of household risk-sharing, but we accomplish that by means
of a causal identification, in the sense that we estimate cross-sectional effects of head’s
earnings growth on consumption growth, controlling for the other intertemporal/life-
cycle effects, and strive to purge the earnings variation from endogenous components –
such as the change in labor supply. Using our framework, we obtain results that can shed
light on household risk-sharing behavior under several dimensions. First, we find that
Italian households were able to smooth about 85% of shocks to household head’s earn-
ings in both 2008–2010 and 2010–2012 spells. Second, perhaps surprisingly, the most
important smoothing mechanisms turn out to be self-insurance (i.e., (dis-)savings) and
within-household risk-sharing (i.e., income pooling) which, in 2010–2012, were able to
absorb as much as 47% and 14% of a shock, respectively. Informal risk-sharing and the
capital income channel play a remarkably negligible role, as their small point estimate
is accompanied by statistical nonsignificance; this result is not totally surprising, given
the often limited degree of financial depth uncovered in studies on Italian household
portfolios as well as the well known problem of underreporting of financial assets in
the surveys, with the SHIW not being an exception (D’Aurizio, Faiella, Iezzi and Neri
(2006)).11
8Indeed, as shown by equation (3), household consumption (growth) depends on aggregate income
(growth) and taste shock (growth), but not on idiosyncratic variables, such as household’s (household
head’s) income. See Sørensen and Yosha (1998).
9See, for example, Attanasio and Davis (1996).
10See Gervais and Klein (2010), who show how Dynarski and Gruber’s estimations of household risk-
sharing are downward biased due to the CEX structure.
11However, financial capital incomes in our data set exhibit a limited variability, as they are reconstructed
as a linear projection of the different assets’ risk classes held by the households.
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While private risk-sharing buffers the bulk of a shock, public risk-sharing only cush-
ions about 20% of a shock in both periods, with taxes smoothing more than transfers.
Interestingly, our study uncovers a smoothing role for substitution of goods with differ-
ent durability, at least in the period 2008–2010. This is consistent with other findings
in the literature (see, for example, Cerletti and Pijoan-Mas (2012)), highlighting the role
that this substitution plays in the transmission of income shocks to nondurable con-
sumption.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the methodology to estimate
channels of risk-sharing within and between households. Section 3 presents the data.
Section 4 illustrates the empirical implementation to quantify risk-sharing channels.
Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1 Conceptual framework
This section provides the theoretical foundations of the risk-sharing mechanisms that
help smooth household consumption by absorbing shocks to the household heads’
earnings.
Consider a stochastic endowment economy, populated by J infinitely lived house-
holds exhibiting time-separable von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility
functions over a single nondurable consumption good.12 Uncertainty is represented by
a state variable st which summarizes the history up to time t and the trajectory to in-
finity, and can take on countably many values at any date t. The Pareto-optimal con-
sumption allocations can be derived by solving the planning problem of maximizing the
weighted sum of individual household utilities subject to the feasibility constraint that
in each state of nature, the sum of household consumptions cannot exceed the sum of
all household endowments. Following standard treatments, such as Cochrane (1991),










) = μt j = 1     J (1)
where ρj is household j’s factor of time preference, λj is its Pareto weight, δj is its taste
shifter, and μt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint, di-
vided by the probability of st . The importance of this condition is that it already shows
how at the optimum, households’ marginal utility is independent of individual house-
hold endowments, given aggregate consumption and the Pareto weights. This is true
under the assumption, which is standard in the literature, that time and risk preferences
are homogeneous across the population. Dividing the expression (1) at two successive
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12Generalization to a production economy (Cochrane (1991)) and to a multicommodity environment
(Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996)) is immediate.
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The discounted growth of marginal utility is the same across households. The conse-
quences for household consumption growth can be illustrated specifying a constant rel-



























− log (ρj)] (3)
where γj is household j’s risk aversion coefficient and bjt is a multiplicative taste shock.
13
The planner’s optimal risk-sharing solution thus prescribes that household consump-
tion growth—net of preference shocks [log (bjt+1/bjt )γjρj]—must only depend on ag-
gregate consumption growth represented by log (μt+1/μt), and must be independent
of idiosyncratic household variables, including household’s (household head’s) en-
dowments.14 Therefore, optimal risk-sharing implies that idiosyncratic shocks are all
smoothed out and pooled in the aggregate, regardless of their stochastic process; that is,
whether they are transitory or permanent, anticipated or unanticipated, and so forth.
Equation (3) constitutes the theoretical ground for all the consumption insurance
tests which, since the seminal papers by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend
(1994), have been proposed in the literature and which in a cross-sectional setup consist










= α+βxjt+1 + ujt+1 (4)
where xjt+1 is any individual-specific variable which, since the contribution by Mace
(1991), has normally been represented by an income-related variable. As mentioned
above, perfect insurance implies β = 0 in equation (4).
Moreover, since the contributions by ASY (1996), Dynarski and Gruber (1997), and
many others, the magnitude of β has been interpreted as the extent of departure from a
situation of perfect insurance, with respect to the shock variable used in equation (4).
2.2 Channels of risk-sharing
The optimal planner solution can be decentralized and implemented through several
smoothing mechanisms, depending on the financial and institutional structure of the
economy. All these mechanisms provide, in full or in part, a buffer to idiosyncratic
shocks, so as to induce a cross-sectional pattern of consumption which is smoother
than income. For example, the existence of complete markets in Arrow–Debreu con-
tingent claims (Arrow (1964)) or a specific set of securities (Duffie and Huang (1985))
13To relate to the previous notation, observe that δjt = [bjt γj].
14As shown by Cochrane (1991), this result can be generalized to other utility functions, even nonsepara-
ble in leisure. More precisely, the utility function may assume any form (provided it is concave and mono-
tonic), may not be time-separable and may not be a VNM function; in addition, arbitrary shocks may be
included.
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allows households to implement the full risk-sharing solution through asset diversifica-
tion. Similarly, the existence of appropriate government tax/transfers mechanisms al-
lows insuring, at least partially, households whose head’s nonfinancial income has been
hit by a negative shock, drawing from incomes hit by a positive shock. In addition, risk-
sharing can be provided through self-insurance, that is, by asset accumulation (savings)
and depletion (dissavings) through lending and borrowing.15 To be sure, in this case risk-
sharing (in the sense of cross-sectional smoothing) is a by-product of intertemporal con-
sumption optimization. In fact, in a bonds-only economy, where this intertemporal re-
allocation is the only feasible risk-sharing mechanism, the optimal risk-sharing alloca-
tion could still be attained, provided all idiosyncratic shocks are temporary (Baxter and
Crucini (1995), Levine and Zame (2002), Willen (1999)). A peculiar type of (dis-)savings
is represented by the timely purchase of durables, which may constitute an additional
channel of self-insurance (see Cerletti and Pijoan-Mas (2012)). Furthermore, informal
risk-sharing can take place, especially in developing economies, through private gifts,
transfers, aid, or services. Finally, risk-sharing can be attained if the household head’s
income can be pooled with the income of other household members, so as to attain a
smoother consumption at the household level.
Unlike some previous work, we maintain a very general setup by not assuming any
particular financial or institutional structure for our economy, and let the empirical
analysis reveal whether the extent of risk-sharing in our sample is full, partial, or nil,
and through which channels it is attained. We also refrain from modelling endogenous
frictions leading to market imperfections (such as limited commitment or enforceabil-
ity). In fact, the stylized facts and statistical linkages that we uncover will help shed some
light precisely on the most appropriate financial and institutional structure or endoge-
nous market imperfections characterizing the Italian economy in the period under ex-
amination.
2.3 Empirical model of risk-sharing channels
Equation (3) implies that if risk is fully shared through market or nonmarket institutions,
household consumption growth should not respond to idiosyncratic shocks to house-
hold head’s earnings growth, irrespective of the data generating process governing the
latter.
As in Attanasio and Davis (1996), Park and Shin (2010), and Dynarski and Gruber
(1997), we operationalize this notion by analyzing the regression coefficient of house-




















where the disturbance may include a measurement error. Here the intercept captures
the effect on consumption variation of aggregate variables, notably aggregate consump-
15Self-insurance through (dis-)savings aimed at buffering idiosyncratic risk—that is, precautionary
(dis-)savings—should be distinguished from intertemporal trade during the life cycle.
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tion or aggregate income.16 It is useful to keep in mind that no risk-sharing implies that
the β1 coefficient be equal to 1 (i.e., that any idiosyncratic shock is fully transmitted to
consumption). On the other hand, if insurance markets and institutions are perfect, then
this coefficient should be 0.17 Intermediate values can then be interpreted as measuring
the degree of risk-sharing. As pointed out by Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and Fafchamps
(2011), theβ1 coefficient captures the extent to which the household manages to smooth
consumption in the face of shocks to the head’s earnings. In other words,











is an appropriate measure of the extent of household consumption smoothing via risk-
sharing. The choice of household head’s earnings as the shock variable, instead of the
more usual household earnings, presents several advantages: it allows more consistency
between the regressor and control covariates, reduces endogeneity issues, and allows
treating other household members’ earnings as risk-sharing channels.
The main contribution of the risk-sharing channels methodology consists in a de-
composition of the overall risk-sharing measure 1 − β1 into the smoothing contribu-
tions of the different risk-sharing mechanisms mentioned above. For every household,
we reconstruct the following variables:
• Head’s earnings (household head’s wage income + self-employed income + pen-
sions): W .
• Household earnings (household members’ wage income + self-employed income +
pensions): H.
• Household income (i.e., household earnings + capital income from real estate and
financial assets + end-of-service gratuities): K.
• Household gross income (household income + public transfers received18): G.
• Household disposable income (household gross income − taxes paid19): T .
• Household total disposable income (household disposable income + inter- and in-
tragenerational (private) transfers20): I.
16In some specifications of the risk-sharing model, the term log (μt+1/μt) is specified as aggregate con-
sumption growth (e.g., Mace (1991)), and at times it is added as a regressor to the income growth measure
(e.g., Obstfeld (1994)). However, in a cross section the aggregate term is replaced by the constant term.
17See Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008).
18They include unemployment benefits, mobility allowances, and various forms of social assistance pay-
ments (such as attendance and disability living allowance) which are directly surveyed in the SHIW plus
family allowances (Assegno al Nucleo Familiaire (ANF)) that are simulated (see Appendix A).
19A description of the imputation process of gross incomes is given in Appendix A.
20These include gifts and transfers from (non-cohabitant) relatives and friends and maintenance pay-
ments. Apart from the latter item, this variable is conceivable as adding to T informal transfers between
households.
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• Household total consumption (household total disposable income − household
savings): E.
• Household nondurable consumption (household total consumption expenditure −
household durable consumption expenditure): C.
The econometric model is based on the idea that if two successive income measures
do not co-move, the smoothing mechanism represented by their difference is at work.
For instance, to the extent that H and K do not co-move, it means that financial income
flows have provided a smoothing effect. By the same token, to the extent that G and
T do not co-move, it means that taxes have provided further smoothing. Consider the
following identity for every household j:




























where lowercase letters indicate logs.
Multiplying both sides by 
wj and taking expectations, and then dividing through
by Var(

































1 −β1 = β1H +β1K +β1G +β1T +β1I +β1S +β1D (10)
The overall risk-sharing measure 1 − β1 is decomposed into seven coefficients. The




wj . If a unit positive shock hits the head’s earnings, 
wj will increase by
1 unit; if household earnings 
hj also increase by 1 unit, that is, if the shock has passed
through to household earnings, then β1H = 0, indicating that no intrahousehold risk-
sharing has taken place, whereas if household earnings 
hj stay put, that is, if the shock
has not passed through to household earnings, then β1H = 1, indicating that full intra-
household risk-sharing has taken place. In general, β1H measures the percentage of head
earnings changes that is smoothed within the household. By the same token, the second
coefficient, β1K , measures the percentage of earnings changes that is further smoothed
by capital incomes; the third and the fourth, β1G and β
1
T , measure the further smoothing
provided by transfers and taxes, respectively; the fifth, β1I , represents the share that is
further smoothed by informal transfers between households; then β1S is the amount of
smoothing provided by savings and dissavings. Finally, β1D represents possible smooth-
ing to nondurable consumption provided by a variation in the timing of durable expen-
ditures.
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The next sections will detail the econometric methodology we use to gauge these
coefficients as correctly as possible, addressing the estimation issues arising from our
setup.
3. Data
Our analysis of household risk-sharing uses the panel component of biannual data from
the Bank of Italy’s SHIW for the periods 2008–2010 and 2010–2012. The main objective
of the survey is to study the economic behavior of Italian households, defined as groups
of individuals related by blood, marriage, or adoption who share the same dwelling. The
sample comprises about 8,000 households per year selected from population registers
and the survey contains a sizable panel component which allows econometricians to
estimate target variables’ processes and transitions. The head of the household is the
person responsible for the household finance; he/she is the main earner in the family
and is labelled with an order number equal to 1. The longitudinal component allows
us to potentially follow over 50% of the households in two spells of twice-repeated ob-
servations.21 Data collection is entrusted to a specialized company using professional
interviewers and CAPI methodology. The survey collects the following information:
• Characteristics of the household and of its members (number of income earn-
ers, gender, age, education, job status, industry sector, and characteristics of the
dwelling).
• Income (wage and salaries, income from self-employment, pensions and other fi-
nancial transfers, and income from financial assets and real estate).
• Consumption and savings (food consumption, other nondurables, expenses for
housing, health, insurance, spending on durable goods, and household savings).
• Wealth in terms of real estate, financial assets, and liabilities.
• Special modules such as capital gains, inheritance, risk aversion, unpaid work, eco-
nomic mobility, social capital, tax evasion, and financial literacy.
From these items, we reconstructed households’ balance sheets, income statements,
statements of cash flows, and consolidated financial statements along the lines sug-
gested by Samphantharak and Townsend (2006).
Furthermore, since our data do not allow constructing household members’ pre-
tax incomes, we proceeded to reconstruct pre-tax incomes using an imputation
methodology—through the EGaLiTe tax-benefit microsimulation model—to recover
gross figures for basic income and disentangle household allowances from disposable
income.22
21In the panel component, the sampling procedure is determined in two stages: (i) selection of munici-
palities (among those sampled in the previous survey); (ii) selection of households to re-interview. This im-
plies that there is a fixed component in the panel (for instance, households interviewed 10 times between
1994 and 2012, or 4 times from 2006 to 2012) and a new component every survey (for instance, households
interviewed only in 2012).
22See Appendix A
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the main variables involved in the models estimation.
Years Mean Std. Dev.
Earnings plus pension growth (head) (
wj) 2008–2010 20% 32%
2010–2012 −29% 38%
Earnings plus pension growth (household) (
hj) 2008–2010 36% 36%
2010–2012 −23% 38%
Income growth (household (hh), incl. capital) (
kj) 2008–2010 46% 39%
2010–2012 −17% 40%
Gross income growth (hh, incl. public transfers) (
gj) 2008–2010 48% 37%
2010–2012 −02% 36%
Disposable income growth (hh, after tax) (
tj) 2008–2010 41% 34%
2010–2012 −05% 33%
Total disp. income growth (hh, incl. priv. transfers) (
ij) 2008–2010 38% 34%
2010–2012 −02% 34%
Total consumption growth (hh, excl. savings) (
ej) 2008–2010 54% 44%
2010–2012 77% 42%
Nondurable consumption growth (hh, excl. durables) (
cj) 2008–2010 84% 29%
2010–2012 79% 30%
Note: Current prices. N2008–2010 = 1,163; N2010–2012 = 1,138. Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008–2010–2012. Panel compo-
nents for consecutive waves. Selection of prime-age households.
Our variables are measured as reported in Section 2.3 and are all in nominal terms.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics summarizing the distribution of the key
model variables for the two subperiods. In particular, the first biennium of the crisis
(2008–2010) is characterized by a very wide distribution for (
wj), with mean equal to
2% and −29% in the first and the second periods, respectively. However, in the same
spells the growth of nominal nondurable consumption (
cj) is higher for the average
household (54% and 84%, respectively), while a contraction in durable consumption
is also recorded in the first of our two periods. This simple comparison of consumption
and income growth is suggestive of a rather large decoupling of income and consump-
tion dynamics, which we will indeed find in the regression results.23
4. Estimation
At the empirical level, our baseline estimation model implementing the identity (10)
above is the cross-sectional system of linear equations for each biennium

wj −








gj = νG +β1G
wj + εjG
23For earlier years, Padula (2004) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006, 2010b, 2011) also employed the SHIW
data to study the joint dynamics of household income and consumption.
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gj −
tj = νT +β1T
wj + εjT  (11)

tj −








cj = νD +β1D
wj + εjD
where the ν· intercepts capture the effect on the dependent variables of aggregate
changes. The equation system accounts for the likely cross-equation error correlations
in view of the symmetric structure of our problem. The ordering of the channels in the
variance decomposition, and, hence, of the equations in (11), stems from the applica-
tion to the household’s’ “income statement” of the ordering used in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) National Accounts and adopted in
the literature on risk-sharing channels, both macro (e.g., Sørensen and Yosha (1998))
and micro (e.g., Park and Shin (2010)). This ordering is “natural” in the sense that cer-
tain variables presuppose others. For example, for an economy, the construction of gross
national income (GNI) implies the existence of gross domestic product (GDP), which
generates, say, cross-border wage flows; in turn, GDI must build on a measure of gross
income like GNI, on which, say, income taxes are derived. Similarly, household finan-
cial income builds on wage earnings, disposable income presupposes total income, and
so on. Note that we do not posit any causality ordering (as in a recursive vector autore-
gression (VAR), for example), just a logical one.24 Before estimating the system in (11),
we separately estimate the following single equation which, in view of equation (10), is
linearly dependent on the others:

cj = ν +β1
wj + εj (12)
Note that the sum of the β1 coefficients from equations (11) equals 1 − β1, that is,
the coefficient of equation (12). Hence, to estimate the overall degree of risk-sharing, we
may as well estimate this coefficient.
Starting from this baseline estimation, we construct augmented estimations to bet-
ter pinpoint the values of the coefficients in (10) by addressing potential econometric
issues plaguing (11) and (12) as described below.
Measurement errors, preference shocks, omitted variables bias, and endogeneity Be-
cause of the survey characteristics (e.g., response bias) and the imputation exercise we
carried out to recover gross incomes, our data—and particularly earnings—may be sub-
ject to measurement errors. This problem is only partially mitigated by the accurate sur-
veying methodology applied in sampling SHIW households and by our use of changes
in variables. As is well known, such (classical) measurement error boils down to a bias
24By this standard, certain channels in our setup could indeed be switched. For example, there is no
stringent reason why public transfers should precede taxes or why private transfers should follow public
transfers. Hence, we carried out a robustness test (see discussion in Section 5.2 below) whereby we altered
the ordering of those channels. As expected, results are essentially unaffected.
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stemming from the earnings variable. Addressing this bias also corrects the inefficiency
associated with the coefficient’s standard error.25
A second source of bias is the potential correlation between the earnings growth
measure and the household preference variation (taste shifter, risk aversion coefficient,
and rate of time preference) as well as the leisure measure in case of nonseparabil-
ity of the utility function (see Cochrane (1991)). The former is partially addressed by
adding demographic and household characteristics; the latter is addressed in part by
using household head’s earnings as a regressor (as opposed to household income), in
part by including a measure of aggregate leisure, which in our cross sections amounts to
adding an intercept in the regressions.
A third, possibly more important, source of bias is the potential endogeneity of hours
worked, as they might be driven by the same underlying factors driving growth in con-
sumption.
We do not provide a formal solution for this problem, but rather propose and fit an
alternative regression model for which such a problem may well be less severe. It con-
sists of filtering out the average effect of endogenously changing labor supply, Δhrs, from
the change in income, Δw, and then use the residual as a pure wage shock as the main
regressor in the risk-sharing equation. Although this procedure is not equivalent to run-
ning an IV estimation for equation (12), it allows us both to address the issue of potential
endogeneity in hours worked as a key component in overall head’s earnings, as their ef-
fect is removed, and to get an insight as to whether shocks to different components of
earnings are associated with different extents of smoothing, which is an interesting re-
search question in and by itself.
To run this additional empirical analysis, we use information on the variation of
head’s hours worked, Δhrs, as well as other predictors of the head’s labor income rate
of variation, such as the experience and dummies indicating public sector and gender.
Since Δhrs is recovered from self-reported average weekly worked hours and months
spent in employment, it may well suffer from rounding and misreporting. This makes a
direct use of Δhrs less attractive in the ratio Δw/Δhrs to calculate the wage variation
component of earnings. In fact, since with survey data both Δw and Δhrs may suffer
from nonsampling errors, the ratio is likely to suffer from so-called division bias. A viable
alternative is a regression of Δw on Δhrs which, however, must take into account the
possible residual endogeneity of Δhrs itself due to the (correlated) measurement errors
between Δw and Δhrs.26
In practice, we proceed as follows. As a first step of our identification strategy, we
estimate the following model through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression,
Δwj = βw0 +βw1Δhrsj +β′w2xj + uj1
Δhrsj = βh0 +β′h1zj +β′h2xj + uj2
(13)
25As the gross incomes are almost entirely deterministic functions of net incomes, we do not adjust the
earnings standard errors for generated regressor bias.
26The bulk of the correlation between the measurement error in the original variable and the instrument
will likely disappear with the time differencing we adopt. For example, if a household head systematically
underreports her earnings, the effect will wash out when taking first differences (see Dynarski and Gruber
(1997)).
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where we model together the household head’s earnings change and his/her change in
hours worked. We are thus purging the change in earnings from the change in hours
worked, possibly accounting for endogeneity in the latter by using suitable instruments
(the vector zj): an important worsening in health conditions and first-year child rearing
(for females) in the first spell, and the occurrence of unemployment and first-year child
rearing (for females) for the second spell.
For the common instrument (first-year child rearing), the identifying restriction
rests on the following argument: during the period of compulsory absence, which in
Italy is equal to 3 months after delivery, the worker is entitled to maternity allowances
and/or indemnities which compensate the wage loss. The idea is therefore that in the
first year of a child’s life, workers (especially women) certainly experience a reduction
in hours worked, with a fall in earnings that is less than proportional to the reduction
in hours worked. Importantly, this event should have no direct effect on the wage rate,
at least in the short run. A similar line of reasoning applies to the case of sickness leave
and thus for the specific instrument of the second spell (marked worsening in health
conditions). As for the occurrence of unemployment for prime-age males with children,
we argue—supported by much of the empirical literature—that this type of worker is
characterized by a fairly rigid (full-time) labor supply (Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm
(1999)) and therefore that his unemployment status is unlikely to be an endogenous de-
cision.
Finally, we are using the residual of the income change equation, that is, ûj1 (the es-
timates of uj1) as a valid measure for the pure wage shock to the head’s earnings. This
variable, more credibly exogenous with respect to Δc, is then used as the main regressor
in place of Δw in the risk-sharing regression
Δcj = ν +β2ûj1 + εj (14)
and in the related equation system
û
j
1 −Δhj = νH +β2Hûj1 + εjH

hj −




cj = νD +β2Dûj1 + εjD
(15)
As a last remark, it should be noticed that in order to meaningfully estimate the risk
channels equations in (15), we had to generate successive measures of income, as in (7),
consistent with rates of change in the head’s earnings implicit in ûj1. Therefore β
2 (β1)
will represent overall risk-sharing when we are using ûj1 (Δw) as the shock variable, and
β2H    β
2
D will represent the smoothing obtained by the various channels in this case.
Household characteristics and life-cycle behavior Household-level data are subject to
numerous influences, which are typically controlled for by using an additional set of
demographic and economic variables, so that equation (14) above becomes

cj = ν +β2ûj1 + γ ′yj + εj (16)
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where yj is a vector including standard controls, as suggested in most research on the
topic.27
Consequently, the equation system in (15) is also estimated using additional covari-
ates in each equation:
û
j
1 −Δhj = νH +β2Hûj1 + γ ′Hyj + εjH

hj −




cj = νD +β2Dûj1 + γ ′Dyj + εjD
(17)
Two of these controls are of particular interest: a measure of household’s net wealth
and the head’s expectation for his/her future replacement rate achievable with the pub-
lic pension, both alone and interacted with the head’s wage shock (ûj1). Not only will
these variables control for size effects in consumption, but, more importantly, they will
also ensure that influences on consumption stemming from life-cycle behavior are miti-
gated.28 Additional covariates include changes in household components, possibly con-
trolling for the dynamics in households’ economies of scale and for taste shocks due to
changes in the household structure, the initial level in the number of earners, head’s
(quadratic in) age, the presence of children at different stages of the life cycle, head’s
sector of employment, possible early retirement or unemployment in the arrival year,
house ownership as opposed to tenancy, and geographical area.
Note that the β·· coefficients in regressions (16) and (17) maintain the property of
summing up to unity, as in equations (12) and (11). In fact, it is straightforward to show
that since the set of controls is homogeneous across equations, the β··’s sum in regres-
sions (16) and (17) corresponds to the sum of the β··s in simple regressions where each
variable is replaced by the residual of its projection onto the control vector yj . In other
words, we are recasting the variance decomposition in (9) in terms of the “purged” vari-
ables.
The models we present are estimated on a restricted sample of households with
prime-age household heads (aged 30–55); moreover, we drop households whose head
changes in the 2 year spell. Although this choice might introduce some selection in
the sample, it also circumscribes the household heads to inelastic labor suppliers, who
are less likely to change their working hours in response to consumption changes, and
above all mitigates concerns related to life-cycle choices such as moving from student
to worker status or deciding to retire.29
Heteroskedasticity Though heteroskedasticity problems that are common in cross-
sectional data are slightly mitigated by our formulation in terms of percentage vari-
ations, standard tests still reveal the presence of this problem both in the equation
27See Mace (1991) or Dynarski and Gruber (1997).
28Controls for demographic and household characteristics also contribute to minimize the effect of life-
cycle behavior.
29Still there is a chance of early retirement and in a few cases it is recorded in our estimation data.
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system (11) and in equation (12). To improve inference, we estimate the system by
a maximum-likelihood conditional mixed-process estimator (CMP), which produces
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Nonlinearities An important source of potential bias might be nonlinearities in the
determination of consumption, such as the existence of liquidity constraints. As Dy-
narski and Gruber (1997) point out, consumption changes may not respond to small
and frequent variations in the head’s earnings, but they may well suffer from large, low-
frequency changes (such as an unemployment spell). Hence, our use of variation in
hours worked to purge head’s labor income may reveal the existence of such liquidity
constrained (or simply rule-of-thumb, myopic) behavior. We also try to mitigate issues
related to liquidity constraints by focusing on household heads with positive earnings
in the start year.
Attrition We implicitly address issues of attrition that arise from the unavoidable
changes of the sample over time (due to births, deaths, marriages, divorces, new sample
units arriving, old sample units dropping) as we have to limit our sample to a balanced
panel of households. In fact, we need to observe all households for two periods to be
able to compute rates of change in the relevant variables. As for changes within the same
household, we control for the initial number and variation of components. Furthermore,
we exclude households whose head changed over time.
Outliers To deal with influential outliers and high-leverage data points, particularly rel-
evant in the case of the head’s income variation (
wj), we trim observations from the
tails for which the generic value x is such that x < Q(25) − 3IQR or x > Q(75) + 3IQR,
where IQR (interquartile range) is equal to the difference between the 75th and the 25th
percentiles. More precisely, we remove 147 and 188 observations in the first and in the
second spell, respectively. This leaves us with an estimation sample of, respectively, 1,163
and 1,136 observations in the first and in the second spell.
5. Results
This section illustrates the results of the implementation of our econometric model as
laid out in Section 4. Table 2 shows, for both the 2008–2010 and the 2010–2012 spell, the
ordinary least squares (OLS) and IV estimations of (13), with the change in head’s hours
worked (Δhrs) as the potentially endogenous regressor.
As exclusion restrictions (zj), we use a dummy for the presence of children younger
than 1 year for female heads (in both spells), a dummy indicating “marked worsening”30
in health status compared to 2 years earlier (first spell only), and a dummy for the occur-
rence of unemployment for male heads with children (second spell only). The difference
between the three instruments is that while the first, common one, identifies a shock
that is likely temporary (mean reverting), the case of a severe deterioration of health is
30We build this indicator by comparing contemporaneous and lagged scores for self-reported health
status (ranging from 1 = very good to 5 = very bad). This dummy is set equal to 1 if the head reports a score
greater than or equal to 4 while reported a score less than or equal to 2 in the previous survey wave.
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Table 2. IV versus OLS estimation of head’s earnings variation and prediction of the wage shock.
Dep. Variable: Δw (2008–2010) (2010–2012)
OLS 2SLS − IVi OLS 2SLS − IVi
Δhrs 0081 0082 0091 0160
(00096) (00211) (00105) (0030)
Experience −0013 −0013 0003 0002
(00051) (00051) (00014) (00014)
Experience2 0000 0000 – –
(00001) (00001) – –
Female 0036 −0036 −0042 −0051
(00196) (00197) (00229) (00237)
Public sector 0058 0058 004 005
(00217) (00217) (00279) (00283)
Education – – 0021 0016
– – (0010) (0010)
Constant 0154 0154 −0172 −0131
(00572) (0057) (0061) (0065)
R2 007 007 008 004
No. of cases 1,163 1,163 1,136 1,136
F-test of excl. instr. – 14803 – 6199
Hansen’s J p-value – 032 – 028
Endogeneity test p-value – 099 – 003
Note: OLS and IV estimation of model (13) and prediction of ûj1 with estimator suggested by the endogeneity test.
iInstrumented: Δhrs. Excluded instruments: 1. Health conditions marked worsening (dummy) and 2. first-year child rearing
for females (dummy) (2008–2010). 2. Occurrence of unemployment for males with children (dummy) and 2. first-year child
rearing for females (dummy) (2010–2012). Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008–2010–2012. Panel components for consecutive
waves. Selection of prime-age households.
generally associated with permanent innovations (see, for example, Jappelli and Pista-
ferri (2010a)). Regarding unemployment, although the related wage shock may persist in
the medium run, it should not be permanent. Hence, it seems likely that in the first spell,
we are identifying a rather temporary earnings shock and identifying a more persistent
one in the second.
As expected, these indicators show a negative and significant explanatory power on
the variation of head’s hours worked, with the F-test statistic on excluded instruments
that is well above the conventional threshold of 10 in both first stage equations in both
periods, thus ruling out problems of weakness. Since we have two exclusion restric-
tions for one potential endogenous regressor in each spell, the structural parameters
are, technically, overidentified31 and we can test the instruments’ orthogonality. In the
first period, the endogeneity tests do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of regres-
sor exogeneity, while they do reject in the second. Finally, the Hansen J test does not
allow rejecting the null of instruments’ orthogonality.
31For a discussion of identification issues, see Section 4.
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1% −0845 −1072 1% −1150 −1435
5% −0561 −1063 5% −0609 −1372
10% −0383 −1039 (Obs. 1,163) 10% −0414 −1280 (Obs. 1,136)
25% −0134 −1039 25% −0159 −1229
50% 0014 Mean −0.001 50% 0002 Mean 0.001
Largest (Std. Dev. 0.308) Largest (Std. Dev. 0.369)
75% 0155 1071 75% 0177 1248
90% 0342 1080 Var. 0095 90% 0392 1280 Var. 0136
95% 0504 1081 Skew. −0161 95% 0606 1301 Skew. 0035
99% 0897 1220 Kurt. 478 99% 1181 1343 Kurt. 530
Note: Note: Prediction of ûj1 from equation (13). Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008–2010–2012. Panel components for con-
secutive waves. Selection of prime-age households.
Table 2 shows both OLS and IV estimates for comparison, but since in the first spell
the two estimates are practically identical, we use the IV estimator for both period to
make correct inferences on the residuals uj1 (proxy of a wage shock), whose distributions
are reported in Table 3, and we can estimate equations (14) and (16) with robust OLS
and the systems (15) and (17) with CMP–SUR by using head’s wage shock as the main
predictor in all equations.
5.1 Overall risk-sharing
Table 4 illustrates the results for 2008–2010 and 2010–2012 of our baseline specification
(12) as in the ASY (1996) original setup (columns 1 and 2), the specification based on
wage shocks (uj1) without additional controls (14) (columns 3 and 4), and the full specifi-
cation (16) (columns 5 and 6) based on wage shocks (uj1) with additional controls, whose
estimated coefficients are not reported for the sake of space, with the exception of the
interaction between the expectation for the future replacement rate achievable with the
public pension (reprate) and household head’s wage shocks (i.e., û1 ∗ reprate). Our pre-
ferred estimation (full model OLS in columns 5 and 6) shows that Italian households
were able to smooth around 85% of a wage shock to the household head in both 2008–
2010 and 2010–2012, while the above-mentioned interaction is not statistically signifi-
cant at standard significance levels.32
That the β· estimated coefficients are not very different across the three specifica-
tions is noteworthy, as it suggests that, overall, shocks to basic income are smoothed
very much like pure wage shocks and that our basic econometric model is quite robust.
32In passing, it is worth noticing that partial lack of insurance is only imputable to negative shocks, as
the overall insurance coefficient corresponding to positive shocks is always nonstatistically significant, and
ranges from −0018 to 008. Self-insurance is always viable with positive shocks.
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Table 4. Overall risk-sharing.
Dep. Variable: 
cj (1) (2) (3)
Benchmark OLS Adjusted OLS Full Model OLS
2008–2010 2010–2012 2008–2010 2010–2012 2008–2010 2010–2012
Unsmoothed consumption
[β1|2]: (
wj |̂u1) 0170 0151 0143 0133 0146 0149
(00452) (00306) (00446) (00322) (00430) (00323)
[
β2]: (û1 ∗ reprate) −0065 0157
(02055) (01343)
Constant 0081 0084 0084 0080 0606 −0228
(00128) (00120) (00127) (00121) (04921) (05317)
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0036 0037 0024 0028 0120 0089
No. of cases 1,163 1,138 1,163 1,129 1,163 1,129
Note: Estimation of equations (12) (columns 1 and 2), (14) (columns 3 and 4), and (16) (columns 5 and 6). [β1|2] is the wage
shock (i.e., 
wj in column 1, û1 in columns 2 and 3) estimated coefficient; [
β2] = û1 ∗ reprate is the variation of [β2] related to
heterogeneity in pension expectations. Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008–2010–2012. Panel components for consecutive waves.
Selection of prime-age households.
Nevertheless, we advocate the use of our augmented model in terms of uj1, as we believe
it yields more reliable results under general conditions.
Despite slight differences between the various specifications, the qualitative con-
clusions carry over across all estimations: household risk-sharing in Italy can smooth
more than 80% of a primitive source of shocks such as those to the head’s earnings.
This result is consistent with most studies on risk-sharing in Italy, both at the micro-
and macrolevel: for example, at the macrolevel, Scorcu (1997) and Cellini and Scorcu
(2002) for 1971–1993 and Dedola, Usai, and Vannini (1999) for 1983–1992, Mélitz and
Zumer (1999) for 1984–1992, Gardini, Cavaliere, and Fanelli (2005) for 1960–1995, and
Cavaliere, Fanelli, and Gardini (2006) for 1960–2001 all find a notable and significant de-
grees of smoothing among Italian regions; at the microlevel Krueger and Perri (2011b)
for 1987–2008 reach results on the overall degree of risk-sharing which are quite close to
ours.
5.2 Risk-sharing channels
How the overall smoothing breaks down across the seven channels of risk-sharing we
have identified is shown in Table 5, which compares the results for 2008–2010 and 2010–
2012 of our baseline system equation specification (11) (columns 1 and 2), the specifi-
cation based on wage shocks without additional controls (15) (columns 3 and 4), and
the full specification (17) (columns 5 and 6) with controls. The table reveals that self-
insurance (β2S) is the most important smoothing mechanism, which is able to absorb
40% of wage shocks in 2008–2010, and around 47% in 2010–2012. Here, the interaction
(û1 ∗ reprate) should disentangle the role of life-cycle/pension motives from precaution-
ary savings. Interestingly enough, the elasticity for the interaction is negative and sig-
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Table 5. Risk-sharing channels.
(1) (2) (3)
Benchmark System Adjusted System Full Model System
2008–2010 2010–2012 2008–2010 2010–2012 2008–2010 2010–2012
Channels
1. Basic income from other members
[β1|2H ] 0159 0285 0158 0173 0162 0137
(00406) (00450) (00447) (00515) (00434) (00467)
[
β2H ]: (û1 ∗ reprate) −0117 −0137
(02573) (02129)
2. Capital incomes (financial and real)
[β1|2K ] 0003 −0023 0003 0000 −0003 −0003
(00196) (00194) (00198) (00131) (00165) (00113)
[
β2K ]: (û1 ∗ reprate) −0023 0011
(00812) (00525)
3. Public transfers other than pensions
[β1|2G ] 0067 0110 0064 0081 0078 0079
(00153) (00268) (00170) (00212) (00132) (00197)
[
β2G]: (û1 ∗ reprate) 0224 0120
(01040) (00723)
4. PIT & property tax on OODs
[β1|2T ] 0106 0100 0107 0092 0114 0104
(00106) (00066) (00113) (00107) (00123) (00098)
[
β2T ]: (û1 ∗ reprate) 0146 0152
(00505) (00457)
5. Informal transfers
[β1|2I ] 0024 −0001 0010 0006 −0004 0007
(00173) (00062) (00079) (00056) (00061) (00085)
[
β2I ]: (û1 reprate) −0182 −0011
(00866) (00203)
6. Savings/dissavings
[β1|2S ] 0397 0313 0412 0478 0401 0474
(00716) (00562) (00714) (00661) (00736) (00594)
[
β2S]: (û1 reprate) −0117 −0717
(03810) (02666)
7. Durable expenditures
[β1|2D ] 0073 0064 0102 0038 0105 0054
(00570) (00348) (00537) (00375) (00548) (00343)
[
β2D]: (û1 reprate) 0134 0424
(02095) (01678)
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
No. of cases 1,163 1,136 1,163 1,129 1,163 1,129
Note: Estimation of equation systems (11) (columns 1 and 2), (15) (columns 3 and 4), and (17) (columns 5 and 6): β1|2H is
the head wage shock’s estimated coefficient on the dependent variable (
wj |̂u1)−
hj , β1|2K is the head wage shock’s estimated
coefficient on the dependent variable 
hj −
kj    , and β1|2D is the head wage shock’s estimated coefficient on the dependent
variable 
ej − 
cj . Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008–2010–2012. Panel components for consecutive waves. Selection of prime-
age households.
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nificant (albeit only in the second spell), revealing a lower shock absorption from sav-
ings/dissavings for those households whose head has a higher-than-average expecta-
tion for her replacement rate. This is likely evidence that a higher expected (permanent)
income in old age might lower precautionary savings and thus attenuate the relevance
of this smoothing channel.
At a macrolevel, Dedola, Usai, and Vannini (1999) find somewhat lower but still no-
table results for credit market insurance in Italy in 1983–1992.
A form of self-insurance through the timing of consumption—the adjustment of
durable expenditure—seems to achieve a sizable (about 11%) smoothing effect in the
first time spell, while it is not statistically significant in the second. A similar effect has
been found by Gervais and Klein (2010) in their OLS estimation of CEX data over the
1980–2002 period. Even more to the point, Krueger and Perri (2011b) find that in SHIW
data from 1987 to 2008, changes in durables are significantly associated with changes in
income but are much smaller than the income changes. Also previous findings showing
a substitution between durable and nondurable expenditures in periods of crisis (see,
among others, McKenzie (2006)) are consistent with our results.
Within-household risk-sharing (β2H ) is also quite large, as it cushions 16% of the
shocks in 2008–2010 and about 14% in 2010–2012. This result is in contrast to the find-
ings on the PSID in Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) and on both the PSID and the
CEX in Dynarski and Gruber (1997), who find nonsignificant effects of nonhead income,
but parallels the results on the PSID in García-Escribano (2004), who uses an ASY (1996)-
style measure of smoothing. Our result reflects Mocetti, Olivieri, and Viviano’s (2011)
finding that the effects of the economic crisis on the Italian labor markets have been
partly absorbed within the households, thanks to (i) the greater diffusion of plurinu-
clear households (the more adults present, the lower the risk of joblessness) and (ii) the
greater propensity to link household formation to employment status. It is also very in-
teresting to compare the estimate in column 6 with that in column 2. As the coefficient’s
estimate in column 6 is about half of the coefficient’s estimate in column 2, we con-
clude that (a) there might be an endogeneity bias affecting the choice of hours worked
and that (b) the added worker effect is associated mainly to a change in head’s hours
worked. Capital income risk-sharing (β2K) does not seem to play any role, as it is neither
clearly positive nor statistically significant. This result is not really surprising, given the
often limited degree of financial depth uncovered in studies on Italian household port-
folios as well as the well known problem of underreporting of financial assets in house-
hold surveys, SHIW not being an exception (D’Aurizio, Faiella, Iezzi and Neri (2006)).33
Moreover, our result is consistent with Massa and Simonov’s (2006) finding that Swedish
investors do not hedge, but invest in stocks closely related to their nonfinancial income.
Massa and Simonov document that this is directly related to “familiarity,” that is, the tilt
to invest in stocks that are geographically and professionally close to the investor or that
have been held for a long period.34
33See Guiso and Jappelli (2000).
34We must also report a limited variability of financial capital incomes in the survey that are recon-
structed as a linear projection of the different risk classes of the assets held by the households.
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To these formal channels we can add the informal one that consists of private trans-
fers between households (β2I ) that, however, is not particularly sizable in either spell and
does not exhibit, on average, statistical significance.
While private risk-sharing channels buffer about four-fifths of a shock in both spells,
public risk-sharing only cushions about 20% of a shock in both spells of time, with taxes
smoothing more than transfers. However, it is worth noting that pensions are included in
the head’s base income and the tax channel excludes risk-sharing through tax evasion—
a phenomenon which is particularly widespread in Italy and which we could not take
into account in the reconstruction of basic incomes.35
At a macrolevel, in Italy, Decressin (2002) finds similar results and Dedola, Usai, and
Vannini (1999) find even higher coefficients for 1983–1992, whereas Mélitz and Zumer
(1999) find the public risk-sharing channel to be insignificant for 1984–1992.
Looking attentively at the systems of risk-sharing channels provides a deeper insight
into the mechanisms underlying the increase in risk-sharing when hours worked are
controlled for; not surprisingly, we find intrahousehold income, savings, and durables,
that is, the channels which are most dependent on the number of hours worked by the
household head.
Also the use of a set of controls does make a difference both in the channels’ esti-
mates and in their precision (see, e.g., the β2· coefficients for intrahousehold risk-sharing
in 2010–2012 for public taxes/transfers and for durables), again corroborating our mod-
elling choice.36
5.3 Overall risk-sharing and shock persistence
As already mentioned, the theory only distinguishes between aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks, irrespective of whether they are permanent or transitory, anticipated or
unanticipated. However, since we look at deviations from the risk-sharing allocation,
measured consumption may well behave suboptimally, reacting differently to perma-
nent versus temporary or anticipated versus unanticipated shocks, presumably depend-
ing on market incompleteness or frictions in the attainment of the optimal risk-sharing
35The biggest discrepancy between our measure of tax risk-sharing and the actual tax risk-sharing in-
cluding tax evasion risk-sharing arises in the case where the interviewed household head lies on the growth
of his/her gross income (to the tax authorities) but not on the growth of his/her net income (to SHIW inter-
viewers). In this case, the tax risk-sharing that we measure is presumably smaller than the tax risk-sharing
illicitly attained by the household.
36As anticipated in Section 4, we carried out a robustness test to check the ordering of the channels
in the estimating equations. As there is no stringent reason why public transfers should precede taxes or
private transfers should follow public transfers, we altered the ordering of those channels. As expected,
results are essentially unaffected. As a further stress test, we randomly switched the ordering of several
channels, irrespective of their logical placement. In this case, it is possible to show that if the changes in
the incomes’ definitions are small, compared to the total, the impact on coefficients will be very small.
The largest difference with the standard ordering’s coefficients only attains the second decimal digit when
we move a very relevant channel, that is, intrahousehold smoothing, from the first to the last place in the
decomposition, that is, just before savings. Even with such an extreme change in the ordering of channels,
however, the overall degree of risk-sharing and the channels’ relative importance are preserved.
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allocation. From this viewpoint, a fuller characterization of the deviation from the op-
timal risk-sharing allocation would therefore also be interesting. Since we work essen-
tially with a pair of “two-period” panels, we cannot separate the shocks using time-series
techniques; instead, we use responses to survey questions conceived for that purpose.
While we cannot use the observations on subjective expectations about permanent ver-
sus temporary shocks, as they contain too many missing data, we exploit information
on subjective expectations about following year’s household income variation surveyed
in the 2012 wave of the SHIW37 and combine them with realized household head’s earn-
ings changes.
More specifically, we split the sample into positive and negative earnings shock re-
alizations. Then we use the interaction of a positive (negative) expectation for the fol-
lowing year’s household income with a realized positive (negative) head’s wage shock
to identify the effect of a shock that is subjectively expected to be nontransitory. In
other words, we interpret the coexistence of a negative (positive) shock to current head’s
earnings with a negative (positive) expectation for household income for the following
year as an indication of “subjective” persistence of the earnings shock. Then we assess
whether a head’s earnings shock that is combined with an expectation of the same sign
has a different impact on current household consumption than an average idiosyncratic
shock to head’s earnings. The estimation on the overall household sample (Table B.9)
shows that while the positive interaction detects no difference in the earnings change
slope, the negative interaction is positive (with a size of 029) and significant.
One might observe that there is a discrepancy between the expectation, which is re-
lated to household income, and the idiosyncratic shock, which is related to head’s earn-
ings. However, since the head is usually also the survey respondent and his/her labor in-
come often represents the greatest share of household income (precisely, on average, it
amounts to 78% in our estimation subsample), we are fairly confident that the assump-
tion of a direct link between realized shock and expectation is reasonable. In any case,
we also carry out a robustness check by restricting the sample to single earner house-
holds. Estimates are reported in the Appendix B, Table B.8. We believe findings confirm
our conclusions. In the first estimation, which guarantees the tightest link between real-
ization and expectation, while the dummies for positive (Posexp) and negative (Negexp)
expectations are nonsignificant, their interactions with the head’s wage shock are signif-
icant at the 10% level. In particular, the estimated coefficient of interaction is negative
(−48) in the positive shock/positive expectation (i.e., positive persistence) subsample,
while it is positive (+49%) in the negative shock/negative expectation (i.e., negative per-
sistence) subsample. This is equivalent to saying that the excess sensitivity of household
consumption to an (head’s) earnings shock is, in fact, very low for positive shocks per-
ceived as nontransitory and significantly amplified in the case of negative nontransitory
shocks. Our interpretation is that households experiencing a persistent positive shock to
37The question is, “In 12 months, your family’s income will be (distribute 100 points) (i) much higher than
today (at least 10% higher), (ii) slightly higher than today (between 2 and 10% higher), (iii) substantially
unchanged (no more than 2% higher or lower), (iv) slightly lower than today (between 2 and 10% lower), or
(v) much lower than today (at least 10% lower).”
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the head’s earnings can afford a fuller smoothing of their consumption, whereas house-
holds experiencing a persistent negative shock to the head’s earnings will just reduce
their consumption, in line with intertemporal consumption optimization.
It should be noted that the identification in the single-earner subsample may be
affected by the small sample size; therefore, the findings should be read with caution and
the signs rather than the exact measures of our point estimates should be emphasized.
6. Conclusions
The literature has long raised the question of the economic mechanisms underlying
the high degree of risk-sharing often found in microdata. Indeed, while a stream of the
literature has always implicitly assumed that risk-sharing is carried out solely through
portfolio diversification, the emergence of the channels literature has shifted the focus
toward the diversity of mechanisms implementing (or preventing) the planner alloca-
tion. This paper sheds a light on such risk-sharing mechanisms operating across house-
holds. Hence, for example, our results provide a set of possible mechanisms underlying
Krueger and Perri’s (2011b) findings in SHIW data of a low correlation between labor in-
come and consumption; even more importantly, our methodology can be carried over
to other settings to investigate household risk-sharing in countries where adequate in-
come and consumption data on households are available.
Our finding of a very large role played by intrahousehold risk-sharing bears impor-
tant consequences also for microeconomic modelling. Indeed, as pointed out by Attana-
sio and Lechene (2002), the pooling of monetary resources is a necessary condition of
the unitary model of household behavior. A high degree of intrahousehold risk-sharing
also brings about macroeconomic consequences: findings for the United States by Halla
and Scharler (2012) show that marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the
individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggre-
gated state level. Finally, in terms of macromodelling, our results show that the bulk of
risk-sharing takes place either through self-insurance or within the household, that is,
by using the simplest financial tools available to borrow or lend. This suggests that in
modelling consumption in economies like Italy, a bonds-only financial structure might
be enough to support the basic patterns of consumption. Further research should be
devoted to assess between-households heterogeneity in terms of risk-sharing capacity
along a number of dimensions such as the position of households in the wealth distri-
bution, access to credit, preferences heterogeneity, and more.
Appendix A: Simulation of gross incomes
Income variables in household survey data are often recorded net of income taxes and
other levies on income, such as social contributions. However, for many research tasks,
gross income information is crucial. Examples are the calculation of tax wedges and ef-
fective tax rates or issues related to the distribution or determinants of market incomes.
Another application of household microdata where the lack of gross incomes can be a
major problem is tax-benefit microsimulation. These models feature detailed social and
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fiscal policy rules as they apply to individuals and households, and are largely used by
governments as well as academic researchers. In addition to their main use as tools to
analyze the effects of fiscal and social policy measures, these models are used to impute
tax figures that are not gathered in the survey questionnaire.
In the case of our analysis, raw data from the survey must be appropriately treated
in order to determine the net income for personal income tax (PIT) purposes, then
the net-to-gross income procedure can be carried over. Rather than approximating the
tax system using a functional form (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016), for
instance, use the functional form suggested by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2014)), we replicate faithfully the Italian taxation system in force at the time using mi-
crosimulation.
EGaLiTe (Gastaldi, Liberati, Pisano, and Tedeschi (2017)) is a static tax and bene-
fit microsimulation model. It uses a standard iterative method to simulate net-to-gross
personal income trajectories. The codes are written in STATA. The fiscal module is based
on microdata on Italian families provided by the Bank of Italy Survey of Households In-
come and Wealth (SHIW) that surveys after-tax income variables. The model aims to
simulate personal income tax paid by Italian taxpayers (IRPEF) in order to determine
the status quo distribution of the tax burden as well as the distributive effects of alterna-
tive reforms. In particular, it simulates the IRPEF progressive structure, including its re-
gional/local surtaxes and the main tax expenditures. Moreover, it approximates the dis-
tribution of family allowances (Assegno al Nucleo Familiare) which represent the main
subsidy for households with dependent children in Italy, but, unfortunately, cannot be
directly disentangled from the labor income information reported in the survey. Finally,
the fiscal module simulates the tax impact of owner-occupied dwellings (whose imputed
rent is fully deductible from the PIT tax base in the period 2008–2010) which in the sec-
ond spell is embodied in the new property tax IMU. This latter tax payment for 2012 is
self-reported by respondents in the survey.
Since a microanalysis of tax evasion behavior is beyond the scope of this study, we
adopt the simplifying assumption of no tax evasion in earnings. This can be easily ac-
cepted for employees while bringing lower accuracy in reconstructing gross figures for
the self-employed. The loss of accuracy is, however, mitigated by the fact that we work
with changes in variables, and tax evasion in Italy does not tend to vary much over time.
Given the impossibility of analytically deriving an individual measure of gross in-
come starting from net income, an iterative algorithm is adopted (see Sutherland (2001),
Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001)). In practice it consists in estimating a plausible indi-
vidual gross value starting from the self-reported disposable amount. Then the tax rules
for obtaining the net value are applied to this gross value. This value is compared with
the sample original value and if they are equal, net of a margin of tolerance, the gross in-
come estimate is considered a good approximation of the unknown value. Outside the
tolerance margin, the algorithm predicts a new gross value (larger or smaller, depending
on the sign of the error) and applies the tax rules again. This iteration continues until
convergence is achieved for all tax payers in the sample. In fact, given the self-reported
after-tax income, the characteristics of the tax payer (number of children, dependent
spouse, presence of owned properties, mortgages) as well as the potential tax relief for
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Up to 15 23
From 15 to 28 27
From 28 to 55 38
From 55 to 75 41
Over 75 43
income source plus other allowances and tax expenditures, there is only one taxable in-
come such that, by applying the tax rules, one obtains the original after-tax income.
To determine the tax structure the following steps are followed:
Step 1. Identify total income, that is, the sum of the different sources of income sub-
ject to the IRPEF.
Step 2. Simulate and subtract the standard deductions (e.g., deduction for owner-
occupied housing) from Step 1 to find the taxable income.
Step 3. Apply the tax scale (Table A.6) to Step 2 to find the gross tax.
Step 4. Subtract income tax credits, relief, and tax expenditures from Step 3 (see Ta-
ble A.7 for the employee tax relief pattern) to get the net tax.
Table A.7. Employee tax relief (2008–2012).




Up to 8 1840
From 8 to 15 1338 + [0502 ∗ (15 −Y)/7]
From 15 to 55 1338 ∗ [(55 −Y)/40]
Over 55 0
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Appendix B: Expectations and persistent income shocks
Table B.8. Overall risk-sharing: single-earner households.
Dep. Variable: 
cj (1) (2)
(Positive Persistent) (Negative Persistent)







β2]: û1 ∗ Posexp −0477 –
(02626) –
[






No. of cases 171 202
Note: Estimation of equations (16) breaking down the sample by the sign of
the shock. The interaction of a positive (negative) expectation for the following
year’s household income with an experienced positive (negative) wage shock is
used to identify the differential effect of a “persistent” shock. Notation: [β2] is the
wage shock (û1) estimated coefficient; Posexp is the positive subjective expecta-
tion for next year’s household income; Negexp is the negative subjective expecta-
tion for next year’s household income; û1 ∗ Posexp and û1 ∗ Negexp are shock per-
sistency interactions. Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2010–2012 panel components.
Selection of prime-age, single-earner households.
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Table B.9. Overall risk-sharing: all households.
Dep. Variable: 
cj (1) (2)
(Positive Persistent) (Negative Persistent)







β2]: û1 ∗ Posexp 0115 –
(01687) –
[






No. of cases 578 558
Note: Estimation of equations (16) breaking down the sample by the sign of
the shock. The interaction of a positive (negative) expectation for the following
year’s household income with an experienced positive (negative) wage shock is
used to identify the differential effect of a “persistent” shock. Notation: [β2] is the
wage shock (û1) estimated coeffcient; Posexp is the positive subjective expecta-
tion for next year’s household income; Negexp is the negative subjective expecta-
tion for next year’s household income; û1 ∗ Posexp and û1 ∗ Negexp are shock per-
sistency interactions. Source: Bank of Italy SHIW 2010–2012 panel components.
Prime-age households.
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